Worth the Wait: Determinants of Ministerial

Appointment in Canada, 1935–2008 by Kerby, Matthew
Worth the Wait: Determinants of Ministerial
Appointment in Canada, 1935–2008
MATTHEW KERBY Memorial University of Newfoundland
Introduction
The exploration of ministerial careers has attracted considerable atten-
tion among political scientists in recent years ~Dewan and Dowding, 2005;
Dowding and Kang, 1998; Huber and Martinez-Gallardo, 2004, 2008;
Kam, 2006; Kam and Indridason, 2005; Laver and Shepsle, 1994; Suth-
erland, 1991a; Woodhouse, 1993! The purpose of this article is to present
a new perspective on a burgeoning area of study by focusing on minis-
terial appointments rather than the determinants of ministerial exit or
survival. This article introduces an original dataset of ministerial appoint-
ments for a single country, Canada, for the period 1935–2008. This data-
set serves as the foundation for an event history model that highlights
the causal mechanisms that underlie the ministerial appointment pro-
cess while simultaneously considering the effects of time. The results of
the event history analysis systematically confirm many commonly
held assumptions regarding cabinet appointments in Canada; they empha-
size the particular significance of gender and legal training as well
as previous ministerial experience and leadership challenger status
as characteristics that accelerate an appointment to cabinet. The article
concludes with recommendations for continued research in this field of
study.
Some certainties can be put assumed when discussing ministerial
appointments in Canada. First, most elected representatives to the House
of Commons are ambitious and would welcome a seat at the cabinet
table.
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Given the executive-centred nature of Canada’s parliamentary system, oppor-
tunities for significant influence in policy are limited to those individuals in
or close to the political executive. The attractiveness of a cabinet career is almost
self-evident. Government policy and legislation are initiated in cabinet or cab-
inet committees. Additionally, a cabinet position provides an MP with the oppor-
tunity to develop a national reputation and profile. Cabinet is the ultimate goal
of every ambitious federal politician. A seat at the federal cabinet table, there-
fore, represents the only chair that allows an individual the opportunity to sat-
isfy both political and policy ambition. ~Docherty, 1997: 95–96!
We also know that prime ministers have found the cabinet appoint-
ment process to be distasteful: despite his early moniker as a “cabinet
maker,” Sir John A. Macdonald nearly gave up in frustration when faced
with the task of assembling his first cabinet; John Diefenbaker once
remarked that he had to compose a cabinet which consisted of his polit-
ical enemies ~Punnett, 1977: 56, 63!. More recent portrayals come off as
less stressful but they nevertheless emphasize the variety of consider-
ations taken into account when forming a cabinet ~Campbell, 1996: 317–
20; Chrétien, 2007: 23–28; Mulroney, 2007: 315–19!.1 Anecdotal evidence
presents the cabinet formation process to be a witch’s cauldron where
practical, constitutional, representational, party and personal priorities
compete ~Goldenberg, 2006; Nielsen, 1989!.
The academic literature in Canada pays considerable deference to the
subject of cabinet appointment. Indeed, the classic and contemporary
tomes of Canadian political science ~Dawson and Dawson, 1989; Franks,
1987; Mallory, 1984; Porter, 1965; Savoie, 1999! all expand on the sub-
ject. The conventional wisdom highlights a number of core tropes: prime
ministers hold significant power vis-à-vis aspiring ministers as they have
the exclusive authority to appoint and dismiss ministers. However, this
power is constrained by the prime minister’s limited pool of candidates,
high levels of legislative turnover which render many potential ministers
inexperienced and accident prone, party considerations, and political prin-
ciples which demand a minimal, yet unspecified, level of regional, lin-
guistic, gender and ethnic representation ~Heard, 1991: 49–50!.
Despite the oft-repeated discussions, it has been over 35 years since
Matheson ~1976! and Punnett ~1977! provided what are the most com-
prehensive descriptions of the Canadian federal cabinet and, with few
exceptions, development has yet to expand beyond these contributions.
Issues put forward in the comparative literature on ministerial survival,
which pertain to the discussion of ministerial appointments, have yet to
be systematically addressed or tested in the Canadian literature ~Dewan
and Dowding, 2005; Dewan and Mayatt, 2007; Huber and Martinez-
Gallardo, 2004, 2008; Kam, 2006; Kam and Indridason, 2005!.2
While this article does not delve too deeply into theoretical waters,
it does provide substance to explore and expand the comparative litera-
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ture while simultaneously adding depth to the Canadian case. The first
matter to address relates to data. We cannot begin to address the causes
of ministerial appointment unless we extend our analysis beyond those
MPs who are appointed to cabinet by including those MPs who have the
possibility of being appointed but were not. Failure to do so invites selec-
tion bias on the dependent variable. This article overcomes the hurdle by
compiling career path data on all government party MPs who make up
the pool of potential cabinet ministers: those who are appointed as well
as those who are not. The dataset is also expansive: it begins with Mack-
enzie King’s 1935–1947 ministry and concludes during the Harper min-
istry in the summer of 2008. The second matter entails an assessment of
the changing importance of individual MP attributes and political con-
ventions and imperatives over time. In order to address this matter, the
dataset is organized longitudinally and then used to inform an event his-
tory model of ministerial appointment which highlights the relative impor-
tance of various personal and contextual characteristics.
Although appointment considerations vary by prime minister and
within ministries, prime ministers still have to choose whom to appoint
and whom to leave on the backbenches. This article takes the perspective
that those government party MPs who are appointed sooner rather than
later can be viewed as “more suitable” at that point in time than those
who are left behind. “More suitable” may not necessarily translate into
“more skilled” or “more experienced.” The speed of appointment simply
reflects the prime minister’s preferences, political or conventional neces-
Abstract. The subject of ministerial career paths is neglected in the Canadian political sci-
ence canon. The existing literature, data and methods are for the most part descriptive and require
updating. This article addresses this deficit by focusing on the topic of ministerial appoint-
ments in the Canadian federal parliament. An event history model is developed to estimate the
“hazard” of ministerial appointment for all government party members of Parliament for the
period 1935–2008. Existing theories and explanations for ministerial appointments and their
relationship to constitutional conventions and political principles are systematically tested using
a series of variables identified in the Canadian and comparative literature. The paper concludes
with recommendations for further research and integration with complementary country-specific
and comparative research programs in the field of ministerial career paths.
Résumé. Le parcours de carrière ministérielle est un sujet négligé dans la convention de la
science politique canadienne. La littérature, les données et les méthodes existantes sont major-
itairement descriptives et requièrent une mise à jour. Cet article tente de combler cette lacune
en étudiant les nominations ministérielles au gouvernement fédéral canadien. Un modèle de
survie couvrant la période de 1935 à 2008 est mis au point afin d’évaluer le risque des nomi-
nations ministérielles pour tous les députés du parti politique au gouvernement. Les théories et
interprétations actuellement utilisées pour déterminer les nominations ministérielles ainsi que
leur affinité avec les conventions constitutionnelles et les préceptes politiques sont méthodique-
ment analysées à l’aide d’une suite de données reconnues dans la littérature canadienne et com-
parative. Finalement le document préconise la poursuite des recherches et un rapprochement
avec les programmes de recherche comparatifs et propres au pays en matière de parcours de
carrière ministérielle.
sities as well as the constraints of the day.3 No matter the rationale, the
amount of time it takes for MPs to be appointed to cabinet can serve as
an indicator of their suitability. At the extreme ends of the suitability
spectrum we find those ministers who were appointed to cabinet without
having first secured a seat in the House of Commons; they may be con-
sidered “most suitable” whereas permanent backbenchers may be regarded
as the least suitable or needed in cabinet. Nevertheless a permanent back-
bencher’s appointment to cabinet may be fast-tracked due to changing
political circumstances or an unexpected crisis. The goal of this article is
to provide the first systematic picture of the characteristics and circum-
stances that contribute to ministerial appointment.
The characteristics that accelerate ministerial appointment are divided
into two categories: personal and political. This article argues that the
personal characteristics that MPs bring with them when they are elected
to the House of Commons ~gender, university education, and legal train-
ing! affect the waiting time prior to cabinet appointment. Additional char-
acteristics acquired once elected also have an impact on the speed of
appointment. These characteristics include previous ministerial experi-
ence, margin of victory, and leadership challenger status. Contextual polit-
ical factors such as the government party’s strength in a MP’s region,
government majority size and prime ministerial term are also hypoth-
esized to have an effect.
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets out
the methodology while section 3 describes the data used to build a model
of ministerial appointments; this section also presents the event history
model of ministerial appointment. Section 4 presents the model results
and is followed by section 5 which consists of concluding remarks and
suggestions for future research.
Method
Drawing on methodological developments made in the government and
ministerial survival literatures ~Berlinski et al., 2007; Huber and Martinez-
Gallardo, 2008; King et al., 1990!, this study employs an event history
model to ascertain the determinants of ministerial appointment. It differs
from both the government and ministerial survival literatures in that it
focuses on the time that a government party MP spends on the back-
benches prior to cabinet appointment rather than the time to ministerial
exit or government termination. Event history models are particularly use-
ful when examining phenomena where duration and the transition from
one state to another are the subjects of investigation; they are a more
appropriate set of tools than ordinary least squares regression due to their
ability to accommodate censored data as well as the violation of the
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assumption of normally distributed errors which typically arises when
working with time-to-event data ~Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004:
15–17!.
A key element in event history analysis is the hazard rate, which
refers to the instantaneous probability that an individual will experience
an event at a point in time given that the individual has “survived” up to
that point in time. The hazard rate is expressed as
h~t !  lim
Dtr0
Pr~t T t Dt 6T t !
Dt
~1!
which is the probability that an individual will survive until time t given
that they have not experienced an event up to that point in time. By focus-
ing on the hazard rate one is able to ask, “What is the likelihood that the
prime minister will appoint a government party MP to cabinet at any
point in time since the MP became a sitting member of the government
party, given how long the MP has served in the government party as a
backbencher?”
A useful feature of event history models relates to their ability to
assume different parametric shapes for the hazard rate. Depending on
the phenomenon under investigation one might assume that the hazard
rate increases, decreases, or remains constant as time progresses; one can
then assign a parametric shape to the hazard rate. However, assigning a
parametric shape to the hazard function can be difficult when working
with social and political data because the shape of the hazard may not be
obvious. For this reason, most political scientists who use event history
models choose to employ a Cox proportional hazards specification. Cox
proportional hazard models are particularly useful when there are no ex
ante assumptions about the parametric shape of the distribution of time
of an individual’s risk of experiencing a terminal event. Cox propor-
tional hazard models have been widely employed in the social sciences
and by political scientists in particular. The Cox proportional hazards
model of ministerial appointment can be expressed as
hi ~t !  h0~t !exp~b 'X! ~2!
where h0~t ! is a government party MP’s baseline hazard at t;~b 'X! are
the covariates and regression parameters characteristics which may affect
the MP’s durability. The purpose of the event history model then is to
relate government party MPs’ individual and political characteristics as
well as the characteristics of the political environment in which they serve
to the time it takes for them to be appointed to cabinet. Duration is
recorded as the span that elapses from the time that a sitting MP becomes
a member of the government party until he is appointed to cabinet or
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ceases to be a member of the government party in which case the MP is
treated as censored.
Data
A unique dataset which records the time-to-appointment of every gov-
ernment party MP for the period 1935–2008 was assembled for the pur-
poses of this study.4 In addition to the time spent prior to ministerial
appointment, personal data were also collected on gender, university edu-
cation, legal training, and age. Political characteristics, such as previous
ministerial experience, margin of victory in the last contested election,
leadership challenger status, the percentage of seats held by the govern-
ment party in an MP’s region, and the size of the government party, were
also collected and recorded. The dataset consists of information for 2688
government party MPs of whom 401 were appointed to cabinet. These
2688 government party MPs represent 1684 individuals.5 Of these, 308
have been appointed to cabinet at least once while 30 of the 124 women
who served in the government party were appointed to cabinet. Of these,
306 government party MPs have legal training while 675 possess a uni-
versity education. The mean age of a government party MP is 50 as is
the mean age of a minister on the date of their appointment to cabinet.
Table 1 presents the variable descriptions and descriptive statistics
for those government party MPs appointed to cabinet. Tables 2 through
5 present the same data when broken down by ministry. Some prelimi-
nary observations are worth highlighting. A mean duration prior to cab-
inet appointment of 4.5 months can be explained by the majority of
appointments taking place at the beginning of a ministry’s first term. Min-
istries that display longer durations prior to appointment are those that
are headed by long-serving prime ministers. These ministries provide more
opportunities for government party MPs who are not appointed in the
first term to be appointed at a later date.
The proportion of female cabinet appointees ranges from zero to 26
per cent and has increased over the period under investigation. The fig-
ure hovers above the proportion of female government party MPs as well
as the proportion of seats held by all women in the House of Commons.6
Conservative prime ministers appear to appoint a slightly higher propor-
tion of women ~14 per cent! to cabinet than their Liberal counterparts
~12 per cent!.
The data reveal that the proportion of cabinet appointees with legal
training reached its apex during the Pearson ministry ~67 per cent! and
since then has been gradually declining. Porter’s observation that law-
yers “constitute the high priesthood of the political system” in Canada
may not be as true in 2008 as it was during the Pearson years ~Porter,
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1965: 392!. Nevertheless, MPs with legal backgrounds still make up 44
per cent of all cabinet appointees, although that figure drops to 36 per
cent for the post-Trudeau period. The drop in appointees with legal back-
ground is matched by a corresponding increase in the number of appointed
cabinet ministers who possess a university education.
The mean age of cabinet appointment fluctuates over the period of
investigation. St. Laurent and Martin appointed the “oldest” MPs to their
cabinets while Trudeau and Turner appointed the youngest ministers.
Research on cabinet appointments in the United Kingdom suggests that
prime ministers are often caught between the Scylla and Charybdis of pre-
siding over a cabinet that is too young and inexperienced or one that is
TABLE 1
Variables and Descriptive Statistics
Variable Definition Mean SD
Duration Government backbench MP duration measured
in months. Failure is defined as appointment to
cabinet. MPs are treated as censored if they
reach the end of their duration without having
been appointed to cabinet.
4.48 11.07
Female Dummy variable equal to one if female and
zero otherwise.
0.12 0.33
Lawyer Dummy variable equal to one if MP has legal
training ~LLB! and zero otherwise.
0.44 0.50
University Dummy variable if MP holds a university
degree, zero if otherwise.
0.68 0.47
Age MP’s age at appointment. 49.78 7.91
Previous Ministerial
Experience
Dummy variable if MP has previous ministerial
experience.
0.35 0.48
Margin of Victory Per cent difference between MP vote share and
runner-up in previous election.
26.26 18.51
Leadership Challenger Dummy variable if MP was a challenger to PM
in party leadership race.
0.03 0.17
Regional
Seat Share Share of seats held by the government party in
a MP’s region ~Western Canada, Ontario,
Quebec, Atlantic Canada! in percentages.
61.69 24.33
Majority Share of the House of Commons commanded
by the governing party in percentages.
55.05 10.82
Liberal Dummy variable if MP is a member of the
Liberal party, zero if otherwise.
Term Prime ministerial term.
Subjects 40102688
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too old and stuffy ~Alderman and Cross, 1985: 397–99!. This does not
appear to be the case for Canadian ministerial appointments where the
mean age of MPs when appointed to cabinet resembles the mean age of
all government party MPs. Indeed, the peaks and troughs in the data
appear to follow changes in political generations. The mean age of appoint-
ment for the 1935–2008 period is 50.
Government party MPs’ value in cabinet may be reflected by their
previous cabinet experience. Cabinet experience serves as a key indica-
TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics by Ministry
King
1935–1948
St. Laurent
1948–1957
Diefenbaker
1957–1963
Pearson
1963–1968
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Duration 11 21 3.7 10 5 12 4.4 8.1
Female 0 0 0 0 0.048 0.22 0.03 0.17
Lawyer 0.16 0.37 0.26 0.45 0.48 0.51 0.67 0.48
University 0.16 0.37 0.21 0.42 0.52 0.51 0.76 0.44
Age 51 6.8 55 8.3 52 9.2 50 7.2
Previous Ministerial
Experience
0.42 0.51 0.89 0.32 0 0 0.15 0.36
Margin of Victory 23 16 20 16 18 14 23 13
Leadership Challenger 0 0 0.05 0.23 0.095 0.3 0.03 0.17
Regional Seat Share 76 23 52 19 49 24 43 16
Majority 69 7.3 52 8.3 47 13 47 8.4
Liberal Yes Yes No Yes
Appointments 19 19 21 33
TABLE 3
Descriptive Statistics by Ministry
Trudeau
1968–1979
Clark
1979–1980
Trudeau
1980–1984
Turner
1984
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Duration 5.2 12 0.43 0 8.7 16 0.033 0
Female 0.056 0.23 0.038 0.2 0.079 0.27 0.071 0.26
Lawyer 0.56 0.5 0.58 0.5 0.55 0.5 0.54 0.51
University 0.75 0.44 0.69 0.47 0.84 0.37 0.82 0.39
Age 49 8 48 7 46 6.7 46 7.2
Previous Ministerial
Experience
0.56 0.5 0 0 0.42 0.5 0.82 0.39
Margin of Victory 20 14 24 14 34 24 32 24
Leadership Challenger 0.056 0.23 0 0 0 0 0.071 0.26
Regional Seat Share 58 20 59 18 70 24 70 25
Majority 51 4.4 48 0 52 0 52 0
Liberal Yes No Yes Yes
Appointments 36 26 38 28
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tor that can distinguish amateur from experienced MPs ~Atkinson and
Docherty, 1992; Docherty, 1997; Sutherland, 1991a!. It is therefore a
rough gauge that prime ministers can use to estimate a MP’s potential in
government. One expects MPs who possess cabinet experience to have a
higher hazard rate of cabinet appointment than those who do not. Minis-
terial appointees with previous cabinet experience account for 35 per cent
of all ministerial appointments. Although when ministries characterized
TABLE 4
Descriptive Statistics by Ministry
Mulroney
1984–1993
Campbell
1993
Chrétien
1993–2003
Martin
2003–2006
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Duration 0.033 0 0.033 0 7 12 0.12 0.23
Female 0.17 0.39 0.17 0.39 0.23 0.43 0.26 0.45
Lawyer 0.3 0.47 0.3 0.47 0.42 0.5 0.33 0.48
University 0.74 0.45 0.74 0.45 0.74 0.44 0.88 0.33
Age 51 8 51 8 50 6.9 55 6.6
Previous Ministerial
Experience
0.7 0.47 0.7 0.47 0.19 0.4 0.29 0.46
Margin of Victory 20 16 20 16 38 21 26 18
Leadership Challenger 0.043 0.21 0.043 0.21 0.065 0.25 0 0
Regional Seat Share 75 4 59 18 70 34 62 32
Majority 57 0 57 0 59 2.6 56 4.4
Liberal No No Yes Yes
Appointments 55 23 31 42
TABLE 5
Descriptive Statistics by Ministry
Harper
2006–2008
Variable Mean SD
Duration 3.3 5.3
Female 0.23 0.43
Lawyer 0.3 0.47
University 0.57 0.5
Age 50 9.3
Previous Ministerial Experience 0.033 0.18
Margin of Victory 26 19
Leadership Challenger 0.033 0.18
Regional Seat Share 45 21
Majority 40 0
Liberal No
Appointments 30
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by a previously prolonged absence from government ~Diefenbaker, Clark,
and Harper! are dropped, then the proportion of experienced cabinet
appointees increases to 43 per cent. These figures highlight a unique fea-
ture of many Canadian cabinets: the low level of previous parliamentary
or ministerial experience among those who sit at the cabinet table. Suth-
erland ~1991b! and White ~1998! note that 14 per cent of all cabinet
appointments made between 1949 and 1990 went to parliamentarians who
possessed fewer than two years’ total experience in the House of Com-
mons. Compare this figure with the United Kingdom where ministers who
served between 1945 and 1984 “had an average of 12.2 years of parlia-
mentary experience before becoming ministers, and fewer than 10 per cent
of ministers were appointed with less than five years’ experience” ~White,
1998: 377!. The different levels of previous political experience held by
ministers in Canada and the United Kingdom may be explained, in part,
by size differences in the Canadian and British cabinets as well as the size
of the parliamentary party selection pool which constrain or increase the
number of choices available to the prime minister. Canadian ministerial
selection is further complicated by the comparatively high levels of leg-
islator turnover which further reduce the size of the pool of experienced
and potential ministers ~Matland and Studlar, 2004!.
Anecdotal and journalistic accounts suggest that some ministers who
are electorally successful may receive a cabinet seat as a reward for their
electoral savvy. Maxime Bernier, one of only 11 Conservative MPs elected
in the 2004 election in Quebec also won his seat with 67 per cent of the
vote and a 47-point margin of victory over the runner-up prior to secur-
ing his place in Stephen Harper’s cabinet. Margin of victory may also be
strongly correlated with other less easily quantifiable variables than prime
minister’s value: political capital, constituency support, organizational abil-
ity, or finesse. On average, cabinet appointees have a margin of victory
of 26 percentage points over their runners-up, which compares to 23 per-
centage points for those government party MPs who are not appointed to
cabinet.
Prime ministers have good reasons to appoint party leadership com-
petitors to cabinet. By doing so they are able to silence their most vocal
critics in the party with collective ministerial responsibility. By exten-
sion, prime ministers can silence their rivals’ supporters in the back-
benches. As Carty observes, “It seems reasonable to conclude that running
for party leadership pays well, even for losers. Almost all @leadership
challengers# who were defeated have gone onto cabinet positions when-
ever that was an option” ~1989: 125!. The descriptive statistics show that
leadership challengers make up only a small number of government party
MPs; but 73 per cent of leadership challengers have been appointed to
cabinet. Leadership challengers are identified as those individuals who
appear on the final ballot at a party leadership convention.7
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The representation principle dictates that all provinces, or at least
all regions, should have a representative at the cabinet table. Strict adher-
ence to the principle means that a perfectly representative cabinet should
consist of a minimum of 10 ministers, one from each province ~Heard,
1991: 49–50!. However, the square peg of political principle does not
always fit into the round hole of political reality. The obvious hurdle prime
ministers face is what to do when the government party fails to elect a
MP in a particular region or province. What this means for prime minis-
ters is that the selection pool from which to choose may be so con-
strained as to not make it a choice at all.
The extent to which the representation principle can be realized is
dictated by both legislative arithmetic as well as the political exigencies
of the day. The considerations that inform appointments based on repre-
sentation are varied, malleable and subject to modification over time. To
try and encapsulate the multiplicity of factors into a single variable is dif-
ficult even if perfect data existed. A modest approach is adopted here
whereby the representation principle is addressed with a variable that mea-
sures the proportion of seats that a government party holds in a MP’s
region ~Western Canada, Ontario, Quebec, or Atlantic Canada!. The logic
argues that government party MPs who hail from regions where their party
is underrepresented are more likely to be appointed to cabinet than MPs
from overrepresented regions because prime ministers have a smaller
selection pool to choose from. A similar assumption is adopted for the
party majority variable. The expectation is that government party MPs who
serve in “small” caucuses have a higher probability of being appointed to
cabinet than MPs from “large” parliamentary parties on the grounds that
prime ministers face a more restricted choice as a result of the smaller
selection pool.
Figure 1 presents a graphical representation of the Kaplan Meier
survivor function for all government party MPs under investigation.8 The
graph shows that the survivor function drops precipitously in the first
month and then quickly levels out, declining slowly over the course of
five years at which point it levels out entirely. Figure 1 visually demon-
strates the unfortunate state of affairs for government party MPs. Unless
such MPs are appointed to the cabinet in the first month of their span,
they run a high risk of remaining in a permanent selection pool of poten-
tial ministers with 88 per cent of the governing party caucus. The pro-
portion of ministerial potentials only drops to 85 per cent after four years.
The hard lesson for ambitious MPs is that unless they are appointed to
cabinet in the first few months on the job, their chances of being appointed
at all diminish rapidly.
Figure 2 elaborates on Figure 1 by breaking down the Kaplan Meier
survivor function by individual and political characteristics. Figure 2 shows
that personal characteristics, such as gender, legal background, and uni-
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versity education, all reduce the survival rate of remaining in the back-
benches. Party leadership contenders as well as those MPs who possess
previous ministerial experience also have noticeably shorter survival rates
when compared to those MPs who do not possess these attributes.
Characteristics related to the political environment also appear to
have an impact on the survival function. Government party MPs from
regions where their party is underrepresented have lower survival rates
than those MPs who represent constituencies in regions where the gov-
ernment party holds more than a simple majority of seats. A similar rela-
tionship exists for the House of Commons as a whole: MPs who serve in
a government party that holds a strong majority ~greater than 55 per cent
of the seats! have higher survival rates than MPs who serve in minority
or slim majority governments. The term in which a MP serves also appears
to have an effect. MPs who survive past the first government term can
expect to see their survival rate increase. The survivor function, when
broken down by political party, indicates that only a small difference exists
between the parties when it comes to duration prior to appointment.
Results
Table 6 presents the event history model of ministerial appointment. Col-
umn 1 presents a model that includes government party MPs’ personal
FIGURE 1
Kaplan Meier Survivor Function for Government Party MPs:
1935–2008
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characteristics only. The model reveals that female government party MPs
have a hazard rate that is slightly more than 50 per cent higher than their
male colleagues on the backbenches. A legal background increases the
hazard rate by 131 percentage points while a university education increases
the hazard rate by 50 per cent. Government party MPs can expect the
FIGURE 2
Kaplan Meier Survivor Function or Government Party MPs:
1935–2008. Individual and Political Characteristics
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hazard of ministerial appointment to increase by 41 per cent for each
year that they serve until they reach the age of 42 at which point the
hazard levels off. All of the coefficients0hazard ratios in column 1 were
statistically significant at the .01 level.
Column 2 extends the event history model to include political vari-
ables that pertain directly to a government party MP as well as the polit-
ical environment in which he serves. The strongest effect can be seen
with the previous minister variable. To put it succinctly, experience mat-
ters. Government party MPs who possess previous ministerial experi-
ence have a hazard rate that is 373 percentage points higher than their
TABLE 6
Cox Proportional Hazards Model of Canadian Ministerial Appointment:
1935–2008
Variable ~1! ~2! ~3!
Female 1.514c 1.643c 1.649c
~0.245! ~0.267! ~0.269!
Lawyer 2.311c 1.706c 1.635c
~0.280! ~0.214! ~0.206!
University 1.502c 1.285a 1.313b
~0.204! ~0.177! ~0.180!
Age 1.411c 1.342c 1.348c
~0.087! ~0.084! ~0.084!
Age2 0.997c 0.997c 0.997c
~0.001! ~0.001! ~0.001!
Previous Ministerial Experience 4.733c 4.360c
~0.623! ~0.580!
Margin of Victory 1.010c 1.009c
~0.003! ~0.003!
Leadership Challenger 2.233c 2.107b
~0.686! ~0.646!
Regional Seat Share 0.987c 0.986c
~0.003! ~0.003!
Majority 0.981b 0.976b
~0.009! ~0.011!
Second term 0.296c
~0.075!
Third term 0.390b
~0.171!
Fourth Term 0.295a
~0.194!
Fifth Term 0.616
~0.616!
Hazard ratios are reported. Standard errors in parentheses.
ap  .10.
bp  .05.
cp  .01.
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colleagues who lack this credential. Challengers to the party leadership
possess a hazard rate that is 223 per cent higher than non-challengers.
Finally, each additional percentage point in the government party MPs’
electoral margin of victory raises the hazard by 1 per cent.
The remaining variables in column 2 relate to the political envi-
ronment in which a government party MP serves. The representation
principle has a strong influence on cabinet appointment. The model dem-
onstrates that the hazard rate decreases by 1 per cent for each addi-
tional percentage point added to the proportion of seats held by the
government party in a MP’s region. A perverse logic suggests that ambi-
tious MPs who yearn for a seat in the cabinet should hope that their
party fairs poorly in their own region. Similarly, the hazard rate decreases
by almost 2 per cent for each percentage point added to a government
party’s majority in the House of Commons.9 The personal characteristic
variables are robust to the inclusion of the additional political variables
with the exception of the university education variable, which is no lon-
ger statistically significant at the .05 level.
Column 3 duplicates the model in column 2 but conditions on prime
ministerial term. The expectation here is that prime ministers will attempt
to put together an ideal and durable cabinet at the beginning of their min-
istry. Subsequent modifications may take place but only if necessary. The
implication for government party MPs is that their chances of cabinet
appointment are severely diminished unless they are appointed in the first
term. The hazard ratios for the term variable suggest that this is indeed
the case. Government party MPs who remain backbenchers beyond the
first-term experience hazard rates that range from 63 to 70 per cent lower
than MPs who serve in a prime minister’s first term. The personal and
political variables in column 3 are robust to the inclusion of the term
variable.
Conclusion
This study of ministerial appointments further expands our understand-
ing of legislative and ministerial careers as well as prime ministerial power
and decision making in Canada. The research presented here systemati-
cally confirms many widely held yet previously untested beliefs held by
students of Canadian politics regarding the cabinet appointment process.
Personal characteristics such as gender and legal training reduce the wait-
ing time on the backbenches for government party MPs. These personal
characteristics as well as age are robust across the three specifications
presented above. Political characteristics are also significant and reflect
the continuing relevance of political principles, such as the need for
regional representation in the cabinet. The strongest effects can be seen
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with the ministerial experience and leadership challenger variables which
highlight a prime minister’s desire for stability and durability.
The initial model results are encouraging; nevertheless there is con-
siderable room for improvement and expansion. In order to answer larger
questions regarding the changing nature of representation in the Cana-
dian cabinet, the dataset will have to extend further back in time, prefer-
ably to 1867. Political principles do not change over night and if their
evolution and changing impact on cabinet appointment are to be prop-
erly understood this project should begin at Confederation.
Certain missing variables also need to be developed, coded, and
added to the model. The current analysis does not include a variable that
considers legislative or cabinet experience at the provincial level. The
Canadian political system lacks a linear career path that begins at the
municipal, moves to the provincial, and ends at the federal level. Some
suggest that those MPs who have previous provincial political experience
have an advantage over their peers when it comes to the cabinet appoint-
ment process ~Barrie and Gibbons, 1989!. A similar argument can be made
for those MPs who possess shadow cabinet or house leadership experience.
A second omission entails the absence of a variable that considers
prime ministerial proximity. Among the many considerations that prime
ministers must take into account, personal links—friendship, duty, reward
and camaraderie—surely must play a part. Such a variable will be diffi-
cult to devise. These qualities are subjective and difficult to verify at the
best of times, let alone code into a quantitative format. However, this
challenge must not be ignored and a temporary or proxy variable based
on the amount of time spent with the prime minister on the opposition or
backbenches may be a useful starting point.
Third, the effects of public opinion should be integrated into the
analysis. Research in the United Kingdom on cabinet shuffles and min-
isterial resignations has produced results that can be replicated in the
Canadian context and used to test hypotheses not only on ministerial res-
ignations but also ministerial appointments. As ministers leave the cabi-
net, new ministers need to be appointed as replacements. ~Dewan and
Dowding, 2005; Dewan and Mayatt, 2007!. In addition, the study of cab-
inet appointments should be merged with the study of ministerial resig-
nations in order to build a single model of cabinet and legislative career
paths that simultaneously explains the causal mechanisms that drive both
of these processes. By doing so, the phenomenon that is a ministerial
career will be better understood.
Notes
1 This article uses the convention employed for principal-agent modeling in which the
female pronoun is used for the principal and the male pronoun used for the agent. In
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this case, prime ministers are female and cabinet ministers and MPs are male unless
referring to a specific individual.
2 Kam and Indridason’s contributions are an exception.
3 Despite their status as “fathers of confederation,” both D’Arcy McGee and Charles
Tupper were passed over for inclusion in Macdonald’s 1867 cabinet in order to accom-
modate religious and regional representational requirements.
4 Data were kindly made available by the Library of Parliament. Senators are not
included in the dataset as they are not elected members of the House of Commons.
Prime ministers are also excluded. Ministers appointed to cabinet prior to obtaining
a seat in the House of Commons are not considered in the event history analysis until
they their secure their seat; ministers without constituency who fail to win their seat
are omitted from the analysis altogether.
5 The difference in the number of government party MPs and individuals arises from
the repeat appearance of MPs across and within ministries. MPs who are appointed
to cabinet, leave, and are then reappointed at a later date are treated as separate indi-
viduals although they share similar personal and experiential characteristics.
6 This study does not address the substantive quality of female representation in the
cabinet or the House of Commons. For a detailed discussion on this subject see Stud-
lar and Moncrief ~1997!, Davis ~1997!, Tremblay ~1998! and the contributions to
Arscott and Trimble ~1997!.
7 Despite their status as “leadership challengers,” the remaining 27 per cent who were
not appointed to cabinet ~Charles Power, Harold Henderson, Tom Wappel, John Nun-
ziata, and Shelia Copps! were not serious contenders in terms of their numerical
support.
8 The survivor function S~t ! Pr~T t ! denotes the probability that a survival time T
is greater than or equal to t. The survivor function can also be understood as the
proportion of units that survive past t. The Kaplan Meier survivor function is the
nonparametric estimate of the survivor function S~t !.
9 I included a government party “size” variable coded as the ratio between cabinet size
and government party caucus size. The variable proved to be statistically insignificant.
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